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Since The commisation last hight was rather served, and I will not be there to revow I but I am it to you and to the President to set both my wims on this health as succently as farish. They are as fallows.

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- 2 they are two hears in earner. ke) by defende action or (6) by hubitary actions.
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Since The Commission last hight was rather several, and I will not be the tomorrows I but I am and to the President to set forth my wims on this healter as successfy as famille. They are as fallows.

- 1. The execute of Saint MRBN bases in Cuba Cannat be tolerated. In objection therefore is their elementers by whatever weens very be we canay.
- 2 They are two means in escence. Ker by cliftenation action or (6) by hubitary actions.
- I has one can grand guarante that this can be actived by deflorate action but it recome to me incentral that this Chained should be tested out - work hubbary action is confloyed. If an decision is from (and it hunt be) I can so no danger in Communication unto Perusheben friently worded in such a way that he realizes count be human lumines.
- 4. This I consider an essential broot stip too health what hulting come an eletermine on if the refley is unals constrabating. The tone of this refley will little as something but a don't believe a climat of seminal hundred to war should clitte us. If he have to he want have so reacted were if the strike had come first

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of our return - they are congress for a dictaration of war . with a sentill statement of the reson and all conjugate historiation I have excuse The limit contract but it have to timboto have it tigled of the Branding cesho about my of um they will consider it. Good lich Charles Elsaber Lazarda Timer Company The en of Come many other conflex - land the above seen to we the essentel, I don't quite me the ungency of bullity action -I leake the lave already muted oly bount action are absorbed he after theuthe it the action of the There is a sure of the same deplaced - whom he was taking

(Copy of hand-written memorandum)

Mr. Secretary:

Since the conversation last night was rather general, and I will not be there tomorrow I feel I owe it to you end to the President to set forth my views on this matter as succinctly as possible. They are as follows.

- l. The existence of Soviet MREM bases in Cuba cannot be tolerated. The objective therefore is their elimination by whatever means may be necessary.
- They are two means in essence: (a) by diplomatic action or
 by military action.
- 3. No one can guarantee that this can be achieved by diplomatic action—but it seems to me essential that this channel should be tested out before military action is employed. If our decision is firm (and it must be) I can see no danger in communicating with Knrushchev privately worded in such a way that he realizes that we mean business.
- 4. This I consider an essential first step no matter what military course we determine on if the reply is unsatisfactory. The tone and tenor of his reply will tell us something out I don't believe a threat of general nuclear war should deter us. If he means it, he would have so reacted even if the strike had come first.
- 5. I don't reel so strongly about a message to Castro and this could be dropped.
- o. By chief concern about a strike without any diplomatic effort is that it will inevitably lead to war with Cuba and would not be the neat quick disposal of their bases as was suggested. Furthermore I am reasonably certain that the Allied reaction would be dead against us, especially if the Soviet retaliated locally (vs. Turkey or Italy or in Berlin).
- $7.\ A$ communication to Karushchev would be very useful for the record in establishing our case for action.
- 8. In general I feel that a declaration of war would be valuable since it would open up every avenue of military action--air strike, invasion or blockade. But we would have to make a case before our Allies to justify such a declaration of war. But if we acted first and sought to justify it later we would be in a spat of great consequences.

9. Finally

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9. Finally I feel very strongly that any belief in a limited quick action is an illusion and would lead us into a full war with Cuba on a step-by-step basis which would greatly increase the possibility of general war.

The best course in my view would be a carefully worded and serious letter to Khrushchev and when the reply is received (if it is unsatisfactory) communicate with our principal Allies to inform them of our intention and then ask Congress for a declaration of war with a suitable statement of the reason and all adequate (appropriate?) preparations.

Please excuse the handwriting but I have no time to have it typed. If the President asks about my opinion this will constitute it. Good luck.

Charles E. Bohlen

There are of course many other angles but the above seem to me the essentials. I don't quite see the urgency of military action—if it leaks and we have already initiated diplomatic action we should be able to handle it.

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